

# The Politicization of Religion, Ironi of Ideology and Clash of Discourse Approaching 2019 General Election

*by* Redi Panuju

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## The Politicization of Religion, Ironi of Ideology and Clash of Discourse Approaching 2019 General Election

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### Abstract:

*This article is intended to see the politicization of religion as a political ideology, as well as examines the use of communism discourse which is often used as issues to represent certain individuals, groups and relationships in Indonesia. The method used is a qualitative method, through searching data from the internet, television and other media regarding political religious discourse that developed in Indonesia through the 2019 election. The data was analyzed with discourse analysis of the models of Althusser and Foucault. This study concludes that the politicization of religion and discourse of communism are still interesting issues in the political stage approaching general election of 2019. Discourse is used by certain parties as a way of communicating their purposes to attract attention, create images, divide public opinion, and eventually as a channel to build political legitimacy.*

**Keywords:** *The Politicization of Religion, Communism, Discourse Production, Presidential Election of 2019*

### INTRODUCTION

After the fall of the new order regime under the repressive Soeharto's leadership, religious movements tended to strengthen. (Bruinessen, 2013; Hefner, 2010; Al Makin, 2009; Al Makin 2015b). At a certain stage, this movement transformed into a political movement by using certain religious symbols and attributes in its political activities. The inclusion of religion in politics is what became known as the politicization of religion.

Examples of the politicization of religion in Indonesia after the actual reformation are the widespread implementation of Islamic Regional Regulations (Perda) in several local governments. Seeing its dogmatic nature, as well as the many potential discrimination against women such as restrictions on working in the public sector, the obligation to wear dress, night-out restrictions etc. Some are worried that the application of the Perda is more political in nature to gain sympathy from the majority Muslim population than for the welfare of its citizens (Kamil, 2007). Other examples of politicization of religion can be seen in the 2017 Regional Head Election (Pilkada) DKI which succeeded in eroding the electoral Ahok as the Governor of Non-Muslim Incumbents through the Al-Maidah case, as well as contest of presidential election of 2019 using anti-Islamic narratives, criminalizing ulama, and choosing the president of ulama's choice, etc.

In its early history of development, Islam as the majority religion in Indonesia, which is often used as a basis for strength in increasing electoral potential, is indeed inseparable from the political dimension. According to Arkoun quoted by Muqtada, the political process in Islam has turned profane history into something sacred (Muqtada 2017, 145). This political process in the early history of Islam led to differences in theology in Islam, triggered by the historical process of its establishment which was very influenced by aspects of politics (Nasution, 1983).

On the other hand, the existence of ideology becomes biased in politics. Gerindra who has Nationalist ideology often has a harmonious relationship with the right Islamic circles, as well as the PDIP which has a Nationalist ideology finally chooses the religious leader Ma'ruf Amin to become a vice presidential candidate. Thus, it is precisely what Althusser said that ideology is a dialectic characterized by unequal power or dominance. Finally Althusser believes that ideology can be seen as a practice rather than an idea. In Althusser's view, ideology is often used as a tool to perpetuate oppression (Eriyanto, 2001: p.98). Instead, it can also perpetuate power.

Jokowi's political communication in the last three years has been carried out by going down as well as intense media exposure, highlighting the vision of nationalism by stemming religious discourse. The politicization of religion itself currently receives wide attention, which can be juxtaposed with political ideologies that have aspirations to control freedom through self-control (JJ Clrkson & JR et al, 2015: 8250). In addition, based on the image theory and the theory of public opinion conducted by Panuju, it shows that Jokowi built a very strong image in the current image, the image of desire (vision), and the image of appearance, while Jokowi is weak in mirror images and corporate images (Panuju, 2017).

Therefore, all discourses are responded to both as the production of discourse and the reproduction of discourse. One discourse that is continually produced and reproduced from the New Order period until now is a discourse about the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or communism. The issue that was raised was that the PKI was a latent danger to the nation, which was anti-Pancasila, anti-NKRI, and anti-pluralism. Communism issue has a high value in communication (information values) because it contains a traumatic historical meaning for the Indonesian people. Especially with the events of the PKI movement on September 30, 1965 which caused tragedy (murder) both victims of the military (army), civil society, and PKI members themselves.

The danger discourse of communist ideology has a high value of information. Communication values (information values) are concepts that analogize with news values in journalism, which is information that has a high magnitude appeal, so that audiences pay more attention than other issues. The issue of latent danger of communism is attracting attention besides the issue is tense (traumatic), it also reinforced by the political movement of the status quo in 2017 introducing "radicalism" as a political jargon of the Jokowi government to label or stigmatize opponents of political opponents.

To stem the discourse of communism, the issue of sublimated radicalism is not only "communism" but with anti-thesis of trans-national religious understanding. One of them is the HTI group (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia). To ensure this, the Government even issued a Government Regulation in Lieu of the Law (Perpu) on Mass Organizations (Perpu No. 2 of 2017). With the Perpu, the government dissolved the HTI organization. The Perpu is approved by the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives (DPR) on October 24, 2017, so that the Perpu is valid to become an Act.

The issue of communism has always been recycled from time to time which is used for ideological competition. Besides, religious issues are also continuously produced and reproduced to enhance the electoral effect ahead of the presidential election of 2019. This research will unravel the various issues above in political contestation ahead of the 2019 Presidential Election.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **Discourse Production**

Although communism as an ideology in Indonesia ended in 1966, it was still produced and reproduced as a discourse. This article limits the production and reproduction of communism as a discourse in the period 2016-2017 with consideration because in the past 2 years the discourse of communism produced and reproduced was relatively large.

The preaching of communism in the view (perspective) of discourse analysis is not just dissemination of facts that are informative or merely to be known by the public, but contain certain intentions for the conveyer. Conveyers here can be media that take advantage of these issues but can also be certain parties, both individuals and institutions. If the purpose of the study is to know the alignments of the media in broadcasting the issue, the method used is usually framing analysis, whereas if the purpose is to identify issues used by whom and for whom, it is customary to use the discourse analysis. Since this study limits itself to discourse analysis research, it first avoids using frame analysis.

As a discourse produced and reproduced since independence in 1945, the discourse of communism has a changing context. Historian Taufik Abdullah excluded the journey of Communism ideology before and after the outbreak of September 30, 1965. Before the incident erupted, the ideology of communism carried out by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had become the top three ideologies that competed to win the people's hearts; the ideology of communism, ideology of capitalism, and militarism. During the period of Soekarno's influence began to fade, there were signs of Sukarno being hostile to the West, especially the United States. Soekarno made a Jakarta-Peking-Moscow axis to fight American propaganda. Soekarno's moves received support from the PKI (Taufik Abdullah, 2012).

Furthermore, Taufik Abdullah said that the events of 1965 had extraordinary social impacts and actively involved various elements of society. Order, ethics, and norms in society are damaged. Under the New Order, communism as an ideology also experienced a shift in meaning philosophically. It is no longer just a collection of ideas of philosophical schools, but has been narrowed down to a collection of everything that means bad and evil (Taufik Abdullah, 2012).

In other words, the term communism experienced a shift in situational meaning, which had a positive connotation in the Old Order and became negative during the New Order period. What happened after entering the Order of Reformation (post 1998)? The positive and negative impressions are definitely divided according to each experience. For people who have been traumatized by communism, they tend to be resistant to the term communism. Prof. Dr. T Jacob called communism "the ghost of communism". Like ghosts, said Jacob, it's difficult to drive. It has the potential to rise again. T. Jacob states:

"Communist ghosts rise again and tempt people who have no faith or principle or are not strong. It is imagined that communism is permitted to be read and studied, then all

other ideologies will immediately lose. The Communists will empower and form the People's Democratic Republic towards the editor of the proletariat." (Jacob, 2004: 277)

In contrast to those who worship communist ideology, the discourse of communism is considered to be a good connotation. The discourse developed was human rights violations against citizens who were accused of being involved in the G 30 S / PKI movement. Therefore they need rehabilitation (Denny JA, 2006: 129). The word rehabilitation shows that they are "victims". Similar to drug users who are considered victims, the solution is "rehabilitation".

This study began by gathering efforts to produce communism and reproduction to find out the symbol of why this happened and who took part in the production and reproduction of communism.

The production of the discourse of communism surfaced again after being stagnant during the Soeharto era, when Gus Dur was President of the Republic of Indonesia. Gus Dur said this: "Tens of thousands or maybe hundreds of thousands of people were imprisoned for being accused of being involved in the PKI. Many died in very sad conditions, while many who still lived did not have political rights at all, including the right to vote in general elections. Their houses and property were confiscated. Meanwhile, their stigma is the traitor of the nation, which is still inherent in them until now," ([www.news.detik.com/kolom/3663373/consolidation-1965-belajar-dari-gus-dur](http://www.news.detik.com/kolom/3663373/consolidation-1965-belajar-dari-gus-dur)).

After that, the reproduction was continued at the National Symposium of the 1965 G30S / PKI Event which was held two days at the Arya Duta Hotel Jakarta. The symposium recommended resolving the cases of formidable human rights violations in 1965 through reconciliation. The figure who played a role in this symposium was Luhut Binsar Panjaitan who at that time served as the Coordinating Minister for Law and Human Rights and Agus Widjono, the Governor of National Security Institution (Lemhanas) at that time (<http://www.mediaindonesia.com>).

Furthermore, the figure who claimed his ancestor became a victim of human rights in 1965 joined the Research Foundation of Murder Victim (YPKP). YPKP conducted investigations in several areas and found mass graves suspected of being the graves of people accused of being PKI members or sympathizers. It is said that the fact-finding effort was intimidated by several parties. Moreover, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan defended them with diction: "Do not interfere with his work," Luhut said in response to a reporter's question in Jakarta, Monday (09/05) afternoon (<http://www.bbc.com>). This effort, according to Binsar, received support from President Jokowi with the following narrative: Coordinating Minister for Political and Legal Affairs Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan said President Joko Widodo ordered him to look for the graves of victims of the 1965 incident. ([Http://www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com)).

The production of discourse is not only made by Indonesians but also foreigners, including an International People's Tribunal Judge, stating that the Indonesian State is guilty and must be responsible for crimes against humanitarian values. Chief Judge Zak Jacob stated, the Indonesian Government must apologize to the victims, and the families of the victims. The government was also urged to investigate crimes against humanity, as demanded by the National Human Rights Commission and National Commission on Violence Against Women in its report. (<http://nasional.kompas.com>)

### **Discourse Reproduction**

The production of the discourse mentioned above is reproduced bipolarly, both those who support and those who reject it. Those who refuse to interpret it as a sign of the rise of communism. FPI (Defender Front of Islam) through its Chairman Habieb Rizieq saw the most striking signs were the continuous efforts of various parties who pressed the MPR RI to revoke TAP MPRS No XXV / 1966. ([www.rappler.com](http://www.rappler.com))

Ratna Mufidah, a housewife, HTI activist (before being disbanded) wrote: The enemy of Islam is not only capitalism which is currently represented by America as the world's superpower, but also communism represented by China and towards its rise to dominate parts of the world (<http://www.voa-islam.com/read/world-analysis/2016/09/29/46451/mewaspadai-bangkitnya-komunisme-di-indonesia/#sthash.AOZ8h4fB.dpbs>)

Another figure who reproduces communism is Kiflan Zein. Kivlan is a retired two-star general. His name is famous in the media coverage. He often stirs up the latent danger of the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the current era of President Joko Widodo's leadership. For Kivlan, the Communists were not only a threat, but it is already present in the community. Repeatedly he mentioned that PKI is reorganized and had a base (<http://news.liputan6.com/read/3100590/kivlan-zein-dan-isu-kebangkitan-pki>).

Approaching September 30, 2017, TNI Commander General Gatot Nurmantyo ordered the Indonesian National Army (TNI) to watch the G 30 S / PKI film, with the intention that the younger generation would not be provoked again. The order of the TNI Commander, who was originally directed to his ranks, was welcomed by civil society by watching the film together. Even President Jokowi watched along with hundreds of residents in the city of Bogor at the Makorem 061 / Suryakencana Tennis Court on Friday night (29/9/2017). (<http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/09/30/nonton-bareng-di-bogor-panglima-tni-jokowi-serius-nonton-film-g30spki-jadi-tak-sempat-komentar>)

The reproduction of communist discourses that is generally defensive with human rights issues. Ariel Haryanto stated that the discourse of communism was always produced and reproduced ahead of general election. In that context, it is understandable why the issue of "communist danger" has now recurred. The 2019 election is not far away. Moreover, the 2017 Jakarta Governor's election has heated up (<https://www.cnnindonesia.com>). Haryanto's statement is in accordance with Althusser's view, that every person and social institution has a share in disseminating ideology. Every individual and social institution also has a subjective view of the function of its ideology. When simplified, the dissemination of the ideology of communism represents the strength of individuals and institutions as follows:

Table 1. Representation of Individual Strength of Disseminating the Communism Discourse

| Discourse Type | Individual             | Affiliation            |
|----------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Danger Latent  | Habieb Rizieq          | FPI                    |
|                | Joko Widodo            | President of Indonesia |
|                | Gatot Nurmantyo        | Commander of TNI       |
|                | Luhut Binsar Panjaitan | Coordinating Minister  |

|              |                        |   |
|--------------|------------------------|---|
|              | Kivlan Zein            | for Politics and<br>Security<br>TNI, Gerindra Party   |
|              | Ratna Mufidah          | A Housewife/HTI                                       |
| Human Rights | Ariel Haryanto         | Professor, Academics                                  |
|              | Zak Jacob              | International Judge                                   |
|              |                        | Mass Victim Research<br>Foundation                    |
|              | Joko Widodo            | President of Indonesia                                |
|              | Luhut Binsar Panjaitan | Coordinating Minister<br>for Politics and<br>Security |
|              | YLBHI Jakarta          | NGO   |
|              | Left Islam             | PKB   |

Source: Text Analysis of Media Coverage processed by Researchers

In the dissemination of the symbols of communism, the TNI and the "right" Muslim circles as institutions tend to be resistant to these symbols with different symbols. For the TNI, the PKI was a dark history where the two faced each other in 1965-1966 and the following period during the New Order regime. While for "right Islam", resistance is due to the assumption that communism tends to lean towards atheism. The discourse of communism becomes a pendulum tool of legitimacy that is attractive to the party because of that there are three categories of party attitudes towards the discourse of communism. The Gerindra Party and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) are resistant to communism. Thus these two parties can get sympathy from the right Islamic community and the community who respect the TNI. While the parties supporting the Jokowi government tend to be cautious and choose to avoid the theme of communism as a matter of discussion, except PDIP and PKB which see the issue of communism as a human rights issue. That way, if the discourse of communism continues to be rolled out until 2019, the society will be divided ideologically, the coalition between the Nationalist TNI and the Right Islamic confronts with the coalition of traditional nationalism and Left Islam.

As an individual representation, the discourse map as above shows interesting symptoms, namely the position of four figures; First, the position of President Joko Widodo, who shows standing on two legs. Jokowi's position seems to be in the entity that rejects communism when viewed from his statement "If the Communists hold me in a bad mood" and "behavior of watching the G 30 S PKI film with society". However, when

viewed from his support for the search for the graves of victims of the 1965 incident as if his feet were in the entity supporting communism.

In this case, George Gerbner and Larry Gross helped us analyze this event. For Gerbner, what was conveyed by Joko Widodo could not be concluded that he had a dual ideology, besides being an Indonesian citizen who embraces Pancasila, he was also a communist. Allegations that Jokowi's past with regard to the PKI have been denied many times. So what does that mean? Gerbner stated that mass media (especially TV) is a tool from an established order, functioning primarily to convey and maintain patterns of social patterns. Ideology is an understandable map (Lull, 1998: 8). Jokowi uses the issue of communism as a tool to gather a representative audience. Such exposures are actually just for publicity purposes, part of imaging.

Second, Luhur Binsar Panjaitan. This figure is indeed since the presidential contestation in 2014 was Jokowi's loyalists. He became a successful team capable of carrying out media relations. In some of his accomplishments he appeared on the talk show and managed to explain in detail what Jokowi would do if he was elected President of the Republic of Indonesia for the period 2015-2019.

In the case of "Mama Minta Saham" which dragged the names of Setya Novanto (Chairperson of the Republic of Indonesia Parliament), Maroef Syamsuoddin and businessman Reza Chalid at the end of 2015, for example, circulated transcripts of their talks where Setya Novanto mentioned Luhut's name 66 times and placed Luhut as an "operator" of Jokowi's thinking. At least the discourse shows the influence of Luhut Binsar Panjaitan in the current ruling of the Indonesian elite (<https://news.detik.com>). Naturally, at the end of Jokowi-JK's administration, Luhut became Jokowi's "mouthpiece". In the discourse on the search for the graves of victims of the 1966 riots, for example, Luhut continued Jokowi's order that the search for victims of the riots be continued. Thus, following Althusser's thinking, that discourse is a representation of certain political forces, the position of Luhut is attached to Jokowi.


Third, Gatot Nurmantyo, similar to Jokowi playing on two legs, but the difference is Gatot is putting one foot to Jokowi and the other to the modern Islamic community ("Islam Kanan"). In the discourse of communism, Gatot is clearly (explicitly) declaring his hostility to the ideology of communism. Its proximity to the Right Islam for example can be shown in the events of the incident several times Gatot attended the invitation of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This made President Jokowi issue a statement so that the TNI cannot enter politics. Chairman of the PKS faction, Jazuli Juwaini, said that it was only natural that President Jokowi as the top commander in the TNI warned that the TNI would not enter practical politics. Even so, he stressed, TNI Commander, General Gatot Nurmantyo had no political maneuver at all. "I also did not see that the TNI was politically maneuvering. If a commander is invited by a political party, that does not mean political maneuvering because we talk about the nation and about the Pancasila, NKRI, "Jazuli said at the Parliament Building, Jakarta, Thursday, October 5, 2017 (<http://www.viva.co.id>). Through the discourse of communism, there was a contestation over sympathy for Jokowi between Gatot and Binsar.

Fourth, Kivlan Zein, like Luhut, is a former TNI retiree who is active in politics. Luhut is affiliated with PDI P while Kivlan is in the Gerindra Party. Kivlan chose extreme challenges to communism. Seeing the discourse, Kivlan will bring the issue of communism to Gerindra Party's identity politics in the future. Following Althusser's thinking, the



ideological state apparatus, the pattern of the spread of communist ideology has implications for the party and individual maps as follows:

Diagram 1. Implications of Reproduction of Discourse in Individual Power Relations



Source: Processed by Researchers

But at the beginning of August 2018, all of the above analyzes did not get evidence in the political realities both from the sides of Jokowi and Prabowo. In this context, it can be interpreted that the production of discourse and reproduction of discourse used as a thesis provokes the opposing party to make a decision. The figures who were previously included in the discourse of Jokowi's vice presidential candidates such as Muhaimin Iskandar, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, and Tito Karnavian were not taken into consideration. Jokowi's decision to choose KH Ma'ruf Amin as a Candidate for the Vice President could not deny that the decision was in response to Jokowi's concerns about the Right Islamic which proved to be able to overturn the political map in the previous year's DKI Jakarta Governor Election contestation. As Chairman of the MUI, at that time Ma'ruf Amin was involved in an effort to convince the Judge to decide that Basuki Tjahya Purnama alias Ahok was guilty of blasphemy, because it was considered close to the Right Islamic circle which was considered "hard". But on the other hand Ma'ruf Amin is also considered a figure who can mobilize the Nahdliyin (NU) because of Amin's position as the Rois Am moderate Islamic organization. Until here it can be concluded, that both Prabowo and Jokowi, were unable to avoid politics of identity or borrow S Seldman and C Johnston's language, ideological politics. According to S Feldman and C Johnston, current political discourse is indeed unable to avoid the issue of ideology (politicization of religion), and economic issues. (S Feldman & C Johnston, 2014: 337)

### **The Reproduction RSA (Repressive State Apparatus)**

The outbreak of the discourse of communism seems to have caused Jokowi's government to self-evaluate. If it continues, it will tend to harm its image as the president and the next presidential candidate. Parties who take advantage of the discourse are political opponents, especially the "right" Muslims who carry communism as material for



the demonstration. Therefore, the next government reproduces the discourse of counter-discourse to reduce the discourse of communism. The bearers of the anti-communism discourse were positioned as a threat to the Republic of Indonesia, not Pancasila, and intolerance. It was confirmed on the occasion of the anniversary of the Pancasila on June 1, 2017, Jokowi launched a number of supporting discourses such as: mutual cooperation, tolerance, national unity, diversity, and mentioning threat discourses such as radicalism and terrorism (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2p7-taNaNhU>). After that, the President issued Presidential Regulation no.54 of 2017 which contained the establishment of a Presidential Work Unit for the Development of Pancasila Ideology. Then the President issued a Government Regulation in lieu of the Law No. 2 of 2017 to replace Law No.13 of 2013 concerning Community Organizations. Based on the Perpu, the government dissolved HTI (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia) because it was considered not based on Pancasila.

The reproduction of discourse by the apartment was followed by a very massive movement, both in the mass media and activities carried out by the community such as seminars, community service, and mobilization of community components (colleges, pesantren, and government offices). This movement then reproduces the discourse of the danger of understanding and ideology of radicalism.

As many as 79 chancellors of universities spread across 12 provinces gathered at Mahendradatta University, Denpasar, Bali on Thursday (07/27/2017). They held a focus group discussion (FGD) to discuss ways to anticipate the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism (<http://regional.kompas.com>). Jokowi's apparatus had succeeded in creating a situation as if around us had been exposed to radicalism. Communism and corrupt behavior are lost from the discourse.

Althusser has exactly said that ideology is a dialectic characterized by unequal power or dominance. Finally Althusser believes that ideology can be seen as a practice rather than an idea. If this is done by the State, it is called a repressive state apparatus (RSA). Through the ideological tool, the State forces the perceptions, values, and actions of the community to be the same as those formulated or perceived. In Althusser's view, ideology is often used as a tool to perpetuate oppression (Eriyanto, 2001: p.98). Instead, it can also perpetuate power.

Through the RSA approach, the issue of communism reproduced into a radicalism issue was then concretized as "radicalism is an understanding that seeks to replace the basic state of Pancasila with other symbols". The meaning of the danger of communism shifted its subject from the perpetrators and adherents of communism which is associated with the events of September 30, 1965 to become perpetrators or adherents who want to replace the Pancasila. Many of the spreaders of the latent danger of communism were supported by right-wing Muslims, as spread through "youtube". The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and other organizations were very keen to take to the streets rejecting communism ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VzHDonjbAo](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VzHDonjbAo)). Also noted Prijanto (Deputy Governor of Jakarta for the 2007-2012) said that if Jokowi was President, communism would live again ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN7eoySIkg4](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN7eoySIkg4)). Young people from IAIN Jember also uploaded their rejection of communism ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_CMSno52vYY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CMSno52vYY)). Also the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council features a lecture by Alfian Tanjung that links the dangers of communism with the rise of immigrants from China ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJSj2JaVtu4](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJSj2JaVtu4)). By typing in the keyword "communism" hundreds of videos appeared that rejected communism on YouTube. Among the Islamic

organizations and the Islamic community which are the most passionate about FPI organizations, but because these organizations are based on Pancasila, they have survived the dissolution. The only thing that can be used to strengthen the narrative of "radicalism with the meaning of anti-Pancasila" is the HTI organization. Thus HTI is the only victim of this RSA. Even though there is only one mass organization, as a narrative it can be used to build a broader discourse so that it generalizes RSA as a function of socializing ideologies that identify themselves as groups that are against the State of the Republic of Indonesia.

So far (until this article was completed) each of these groups did not arrive at a horizontal conflict. Both continue their discourse by leaving the source of the conflict. The government continued its RSA to slowly abandon the word "communism" and replace it with the notion of radicalism, then once justify it with the term "terrorism". To attract leftist Muslims, RSA adopted the terms "Islam Rahmatan lilalamin", "Moderate Islam", "Islam Nusantara", and "Soothing Islam", while those who originally used the issue of communism chose to remain silent. So far, the silence of the Islamists who reject communism has not yet seen its future direction. In several groups on social media, this group changed the theme of discussion of communism "signs of the last day", "the morning prayer movement", and others that seemed soft. Thematic metamorphosis can be interpreted as an effort to maintain communication networks in the media that are considered not intervened by the authority of the apparatus. So that the communication network cells that are swept away by the Law on Mass Organizations can still be maintained and in the right time can be revived. The right time according to researchers is during the 2019 general elections to elect the DPR and the President.

#### **Analysis of Power on Discourse**

Another interesting analysis of Foucault's framework is about who is a character who plays a discourse to guard the source of his power. In large flows (national macro) there are at least four figures around the discourse, namely:

President Jokowi played a discourse on communism to safeguard sources of support from nationalists. So that the base of voters who want to be maintained from PDI-P, Hanura, Nasdem, and PKB. Even if Jokowi wants to realize it with Muslims, his choice is moderate Islam. The risk is that Jokowi will be shunned by right-line Muslims. Secondly, Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo himself did not actively play the discourse of communism, but used the figures of both tier figures, such as Kiflan Zein and Fadli Zon. This group is in line with supporters of the Gerindra and PKS parties, while from Muhammadiyah and PAN circles, they chose to reject communism but with a gentle slope. Third, Chief of Police Tito Karnavian. This figure plays an important role in completing the demonstration of blasphemy entitled "Action of 212", although he tends to reject the demonstration, but as a person he is on stage with the figures of "Action of 212". And Tito was the one who succeeded in dividing the opinion from the act of rejecting blasphemy as a "threat of treason" carried out by other figures such as Rahmawati Sukarnoputri and others. The current actions of the National Police can divide public opinion, so that the mainstream media issues are divided.

Yuzril Izha Mahendra as attorney for Rachmawati Soekarnoputri said this:

"The arrest of a number of suspected parties pledged by the police is allegedly related to a number of special meetings with Rachmawati Soekarnoputri. Yuzril said, the meeting took place after an open meeting at the University of Bung Karno which was

attended by a number of activist figures. He said, the special meeting was allegedly related to the charges of the police regarding the plot of treason" ([www.cnnindonesia.com/20161202](http://www.cnnindonesia.com/20161202))

At the end of August 2017, Tito performed the Hajj. The news spreads in mainstream media and online media. After returning to the pilgrimage, Tito was friendlier to the Islamic community. Never even discourse about radicalism anymore. Thus, the reproduction of communism and radicalism built the figure of Tito as a figure who was friendly, tolerant, and tackled the problem tactical.

In the context of religious politicization, it seems that religion will always be a sexy issue for politicians to gain their votes, as long as the religious understanding of Muslims in Indonesia is still textual, dogmatic and doctrinal. If religious understanding is more directed at the form of substantive Islam (Susanto, 2018: 68), then the politicization of religion by itself can be eliminated, because the public will increasingly understand, that true religiosity is ideally to give benefit to all humanity, to overcome poverty, ignorance, and realize social justice (Maghfur et al., 2012: 2; Susanto, 2017: 238).

Above all, based on the phenomenon of politicization of religion, the irony of ideology shown in the political process, and the production and reproduction of discourses carried out by the two camps, the final estuary is how to win the 2019 election stage. Post-election results, discourse production and reproduction may change drastically from the production and reproduction of discourse carried out during the campaign.

## CONCLUSION

Both the Prabowo and Jokowi camps are both unable to avoid the politicization of religion. To a certain extent, religion is often used as an ideology in fighting for politics, its role is often biased, so it cannot be read clearly, where is the real ideology of a political power. What remains is the battle of discourse, in the form of production of discourse from one camp, to then be reproduced again by the other faction in raising the electoral towards the 2019 election.

For example, communism as a discourse managed to divide the political power between those who supported and refused. Each produces these discourses with various reproductive derivatives. In its level of dissemination through mainstream media and on-line media the discourse of communism has changed to "radicalism." The reproduction of its derivatives was used by the RSA as a counterattack, so groups that rejected communism were indirectly stigmatized as radical groups, hence added with the "anti Pancasila" and "Anti NKRI" discourse. The reproduction of discourse on radicalism is more massive, in terms of using existing apparatus as well as through mainstream media, so that the discourse of communism has been successfully sunk or left behind. Instead, the government which was initially accused of being a supporter of communism managed to beat back opponents of its political opponents with the stigma of radicalism. Through Althusser's logic, the process of production and reproduction of discourse like this shows the dominant power of the State to eliminate discourses that does not benefit its credibility.

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**The Politicization of Religion**, Ironi of Ideology and Clash of Discourse Approaching 2019 General Election Redi Panuju Faculty of Communication Sciences, Dr. Soetomo redi.panju@unitomo.ac.id Abstract: This article is intended to see **the politicization of religion** as a political ideology, as well as examines the use of communism discourse which is often used as issues to represent certain individuals, groups and relationships in Indonesia.

The method used is a qualitative method, through searching data from the internet, television and other media regarding political religious discourse that developed in Indonesia through the 2019 election. The data was analyzed with discourse analysis of the models of Althusser and Foucault. This study concludes that the politicization of religion and discourse of communism are still interesting issues in the political stage approaching general election of 2019.

Discourse is used by certain parties as a way of communicating their purposes to attract attention, create images, divide public opinion, and eventually as a channel to build political legitimacy. Keywords: The Politicization of Religion, Communism, Discourse Production, Presidential Election of 2019 INTRODUCTION After the fall of **the new order regime** under the repressive Soeharto's leadership, religious movements tended to strengthen. (Bruinessen, 2013; Hefner, 2010; Al Makin, 2009; Al Makin 2015b).

At a certain stage, this movement transformed into a political movement by using certain religious symbols and attributes in its political activities. The inclusion of religion in politics is what became known as **the politicization of religion**. Examples of the politicization **of religion in Indonesia** after the actual reformation are the widespread implementation of Islamic Regional Regulations (Perda) in several local governments.

Seeing its dogmatic nature, as well as the many potential discrimination against women such as restrictions on working in the public sector, the obligation to wear dress, night-out restrictions etc. Some are worried that the application of the Perda is more political in nature to gain sympathy from the majority Muslim population than for the welfare of its citizens (Kamil, 2007).

Other examples of politicization of religion can be seen in the 2017 Regional Head Election (Pilkada) DKI which succeeded in eroding the electoral Ahok as the Governor of Non-Muslim Incumbents through the Al-Maidah case, as well as contest of presidential election of 2019 using anti-Islamic narratives, criminalizing ulama, and choosing the president of ulama's choice, etc.



In its early history of development, Islam as the majority religion in Indonesia, which is often used as a basis for strength in increasing electoral potential, is indeed inseparable from the political dimension. According to Arkoun quoted by Muqtada, the political process in Islam has turned profane history into something sacred (Muqtada 2017, 145).

This political process in **the early history of Islam** led to differences in theology in Islam, triggered by the historical process of its establishment which was very influenced by aspects of politics (Nasution, 1983). **On the other hand, the** existence of ideology becomes biased in politics. Gerindra who has Nationalist ideology often has a harmonious relationship with the right Islamic circles, as well as the PDIP which has a Nationalist ideology finally chooses the religious leader Ma'ruf Amin to become a vice presidential candidate.

Thus, it is precisely what Althusser said that ideology is a dialectic characterized by unequal power or dominance. Finally Althusser believes that ideology can be seen as a practice rather than an idea. In Althusser's view, ideology is often used as a tool to perpetuate oppression (Eriyanto, 2001: p.98). Instead, it can also perpetuate power.

Jokowi's political communication in the last three years has been carried out by going down as well as intense media exposure, highlighting the vision of nationalism by stemming religious discourse. **The politicization of religion** itself currently receives wide attention, which can be juxtaposed with political ideologies that have aspirations to control freedom through self- control (JJ Clrkson & JR et al, 2015: 8250).

In addition, based on the image theory and the theory of public opinion conducted by Panuju, it shows that Jokowi built a very strong image in the current image, the image of desire (vision), and the image of appearance, while Jokowi is weak in mirror images and corporate images (Panuju, 2017). Therefore, all discourses are responded to both as the production of **discourse and the reproduction of** discourse.

One discourse that is continually produced and reproduced from the New Order period until now is a discourse about **the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)** or communism. The issue that was raised was that the PKI was a latent danger to the nation, which was anti-Pancasila, anti-NKRI, and anti-pluralism. Communism issue has a high value in communication (information values) because it contains a traumatic historical meaning for the Indonesian people.

Especially with the events of the PKI movement on September 30, 1965 which caused tragedy (murder) both victims of the military (army), civil society, and PKI members themselves. The danger discourse of communist ideology has a high value of

information. Communication values (information values) are concepts that analogize with news values in journalism, which is information that has a high magnitude appeal, so that **audiences pay more attention** than other issues.

The issue of latent danger of communism is attracting attention besides the issue is tense (traumatic), it also reinforced by the political movement of the status quo in 2017 introducing "radicalism" as a political jargon of the Jokowi government to label or stigmatize opponents of political opponents. To stem the discourse of communism, the issue of sublimated radicalism is not only "communism" but with anti-thesis of trans-national religious understanding.

One of them is the HTI group (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia). To ensure this, the Government even **issued a Government Regulation in Lieu of** the Law (Perpu) on Mass Organizations (Perpu No. 2 of 2017). With the Perpu, the government dissolved the HTI organization.

The Perpu is approved by the Plenary Session **of the House of Representatives** (DPR) on October 24, 2017, so that the Perpu is valid to become an Act.

The issue of communism has always been recycled from time to time which is used for ideological competition. Besides, religious issues are also continuously produced and reproduced to enhance the electoral effect ahead of the presidential election of 2019.

This research will unravel the various issues above in political contestation ahead of the 2019 Presidential Election. DISCUSSION Discourse Production Although communism as an ideology in Indonesia ended in 1966, it was still produced and reproduced as a discourse. This article limits the production and reproduction of communism as a discourse in the period 2016-2017 with consideration because in the past 2 years the discourse of communism produced and reproduced was relatively large.

The preaching of communism in the view (perspective) of discourse analysis is not just dissemination of facts that are informative or merely to be known by the public, but contain certain intentions for the conveyer. Conveyers here can be media that take advantage of these issues but can also be certain parties, both individuals and institutions.

If the purpose of the study is to know the alignments of the media in broadcasting the issue, the method used is usually framing analysis, whereas if the purpose is to identify issues used by whom and for whom, it is customary to use the discourse analysis. Since this study limits itself to discourse analysis research, it first avoids using frame analysis.

As a discourse produced and reproduced since independence in 1945, the discourse of communism has a changing context. Historian Taufik Abdullah excluded the journey of Communism ideology before and after the outbreak of September 30, 1965. Before the incident erupted, the ideology of communism carried out by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had become the top three ideologies that competed to win the people's hearts; the ideology of communism, ideology of capitalism, and militarism.

During the period of Soekarno's influence began to fade, there were signs of Sukarno being hostile to the West, especially the United States. Soekarno made a Jakarta-Peking-Moscow axis to fight American propaganda. Soekarno's moves received support from the PKI (Taufik Abdullah, 2012). Furthermore, Taufik Abdullah said that the events of 1965 had extraordinary social impacts and actively involved various elements of society.

Order, ethics, and norms in society are damaged. Under the New Order, communism as an ideology also experienced a shift in meaning philosophically. It is no longer just a collection of ideas of philosophical schools, but has been narrowed down to a collection of everything that means bad and evil (Taufik Abdullah, 2012).

In other words, the term communism experienced a shift in situational meaning, which had a positive connotation in the Old Order and became negative during the New Order period. What happened after entering the Order of Reformation (post 1998)? The positive and negative impressions are definitely divided according to each experience. For people who have been traumatized by communism, they tend to be resistant to the term communism. Prof. Dr. T Jacob called communism "the ghost of communism".

Like ghosts, said Jacob, it's difficult to drive. It has the potential to rise again. T. Jacob states: "Communist ghosts rise again and tempt people who have no faith or principle or are not strong. It is imagined that communism is permitted to be read and studied, then all

other ideologies will immediately lose.

The Communists will empower and form the People's Democratic Republic towards the editor of the proletariat. "(Jacob, 2004: 277) In contrast to those who worship communist ideology, the discourse of communism is considered to be a good connotation. The discourse developed was human rights violations against citizens who were accused of being involved in the G 30 S / PKI movement.

Therefore they need rehabilitation (Denny JA, 2006: 129). The word rehabilitation shows that they are "victims". Similar to drug users who are considered victims, the solution is "rehabilitation". This study began by gathering efforts to produce communism and reproduction to find out the symbol of why this happened and who took part in **the production and reproduction of** communism.

The production of the discourse of communism surfaced again after being stagnant during the Soeharto era, when Gus Dur was **President of the Republic of** Indonesia. Gus Dur said this: "Tens of thousands or maybe **hundreds of thousands of** people were imprisoned for being accused of being involved in the PKI. Many died in very sad conditions, while many who still lived did not have political rights at all, including **the right to vote** in general elections.

Their houses and property were confiscated. Meanwhile, their stigma is the traitor of the nation, which is still inherent in them until now, "(www.news.detik.com/kolom/3663373/consolidation-1965-belajar-dari-gus-dur). After that, the reproduction was continued at the National Symposium of the 1965 G30S / PKI Event which was held two days at the Arya Duta Hotel Jakarta. The symposium recommended resolving the cases of formidable human rights violations in 1965 through reconciliation.

The figure who played a role in this symposium was Luhut Binsar Panjaitan who at that time served as the Coordinating Minister for Law and Human Rights and Agus Widjono, the Governor of National Security Institution (Lemhanas) at that time (<http://www.mediaindonesia.com>). Furthermore, the figure who claimed his ancestor became a victim of human rights in 1965 joined the Research Foundation of Murder Victim (YPKP).

YPKP conducted investigations in several areas and found mass graves suspected of being the graves of people accused of being PKI members or sympathizers. It is said that the fact-finding effort was intimidated by several parties. Moreover, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan defended them with diction: "Do not interfere with his work," Luhut said in

response to a reporter's question in Jakarta, Monday (09/05) afternoon (<http://www.bbc.com>).

This effort, according to Binsar, received support from President Jokowi with the following narrative: **Coordinating Minister for Political** and Legal Affairs Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan said President Joko Widodo ordered him to look for the graves of victims of the 1965 incident. ([Http://www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com)). The production of discourse is not only made by Indonesians but also foreigners, including an International People's Tribunal Judge, stating that the Indonesian State is guilty and must be **responsible for crimes against** humanitarian values.

Chief Judge Zak Jacob stated, the Indonesian Government must apologize to the victims, and the families of the victims. The government was also urged to investigate crimes against humanity, as demanded by the National Human Rights Commission and National Commission on Violence Against Women in its report. (<http://nasional.kompas.com>) Discourse Reproduction



The production of the discourse mentioned above is reproduced bipolarly, both those who support and those who reject it.

Those who refuse to interpret it as a sign of the rise of communism. FPI (Defender Front of Islam) through its Chairman Habieb Rizieq saw the most striking signs were the continuous efforts of various parties who pressed the MPR RI to revoke TAP MPRS No XXV / 1966. (www.rappler.com) Ratna Mufidah, a housewife, HTI activist (before being disbanded) wrote: The enemy of Islam is not only capitalism which is currently represented by America as the world's superpower, but also communism represented by China and towards its rise to dominate parts of the world (<http://www.voa-islam.com/read/world-analysis/2016/09/29/46451/mewaspadai-bangkitnya-komunisme-di-indonesia/#sthash.AOZ8h4fB.dpbs>) Another figure who reproduces communism is Kiflan Zein.

Kivlan is a retired two- star general. His name is famous in the media coverage. He often stirs up the latent danger of the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the current era of President Joko Widodo's leadership. For Kivlan, the Communists were not only a threat, but it is already present in the community. Repeatedly he mentioned that PKI is reorganized and had a base (<http://news.liputan6.com/read/3100590/kivlan-zein-dan-isu-kebangkitan-pki>).

Approaching September 30, 2017, TNI Commander General Gatot Nurmantyo ordered the Indonesian National Army (TNI) to watch the G 30 S / PKI film, with the intention that the younger generation would not be provoked again. The order of the TNI Commander, who was originally directed to his ranks, was welcomed by civil society by watching the film together.

Even President Jokowi watched along with hundreds of residents in the city of Bogor at the Makorem 061 / Suryakencana Tennis Court on Friday night (29/9/2017). (<http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/09/30/nonton-bareng-di-bogor-panglima-tni-jokowi-serius-nonton-film-g30spki-jadi-tak-sempat-komentar>) The reproduction of communist discourses that is generally defensive with human rights issues. Ariel Haryanto stated that the discourse of communism was always produced and reproduced ahead of general election.

In that context, it is understandable why the issue of "communist danger" has now recurred. The 2019 election is not far away. Moreover, the 2017 Jakarta Governor's election has heated up (<https://www.cnnindonesia.com>). Haryanto's statement is in accordance with Althusser's view, that every person and social institution has a share in

disseminating ideology.

Every individual and social institution also has a subjective view of the function of its ideology. When simplified, the dissemination of the ideology of communism represents the strength of individuals and institutions as follows: Table 1. Representation of Individual Strength of Disseminating the Communism Discourse Discourse Type Individual Affiliation



Danger Latent Habieb Rizieq Joko Widodo Gatot Nurmantyo Luhut Binsar Panjaitan \_FPI  
President of Indonesia Commander of TNI Coordinating Minister

—

—

Kivlan Zein Ratna Mufidah \_for Politics and Security TNI, Gerindra Party A  
Housewife/HTI

—

Human Rights Ariel Haryanto Zak Jacobo Joko Widodo Luhut Binsar Panjaitan YLBHI  
Jakarta Left Islam \_Professor, Academics International Judge Mass Victim Research  
Foundation President of Indonesia Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security NGO  
PKB

\_\_ Source: Text Analysis of Media Coverage processed by Researchers In the dissemination of the symbols of communism, the TNI and the "right" Muslim circles as institutions tend to be resistant to these symbols with different symbols.

For the TNI, the PKI was a dark history where the two faced each other in 1965-1966 and the following period during the New Order regime. While for "right Islam", resistance is due to the assumption that communism tends to lean towards atheism. The discourse of communism becomes a pendulum tool of legitimacy that is attractive to the party because of that there are three categories of party attitudes towards the discourse of communism. The Gerindra Party and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) are resistant to communism.

Thus these two parties can get sympathy from the right Islamic community and the community who respect the TNI. While the parties supporting the Jokowi government tend to be cautious and choose to avoid the theme of communism as a matter of discussion, except PDIP and PKB which see the issue of communism as a human rights issue.

That way, if the discourse of communism continues to be rolled out until 2019, the society will be divided ideologically, the coalition between the Nationalist TNI and the Right Islamic confronts with the coalition of traditional nationalism and Left Islam. As an individual representation, the discourse map as above shows interesting symptoms, namely the position of four figures; First, the position of President Joko Widodo, who shows standing on two legs.

Jokowi's position seems to be in the entity that rejects communism when viewed from his statement "If the Communists hold me in a bad mood" and "behavior of watching the G 30 S PKI film with society". However, when

viewed from his support for the search for the graves of victims of the 1965 incident as if his feet were in the entity supporting communism.

In this case, **George Gerbner and Larry Gross** helped us analyze this event. For Gerbner, what was conveyed by Joko Widodo could not be concluded that he had a dual ideology, besides being an Indonesian citizen who embraces Pancasila, he was also a communist. Allegations that Jokowi's past with regard to the PKI have been denied many times.

So what does that mean? Gerbner stated that mass media (especially TV) is a tool from an established order, functioning primarily to convey and maintain patterns of social patterns. Ideology is an understandable map (Lull, 1998: 8). Jokowi uses the issue of communism as a tool to gather a representative audience. Such exposures are actually just for publicity purposes, part of imaging. Second, Luhur Binsar Panjaitan.

This figure is indeed since the presidential contestation in 2014 was Jokowi's loyalists. He became a successful team capable of carrying out media relations. In some of his accomplishments he appeared on the talk show and managed to explain in detail what Jokowi would do if he was elected **President of the Republic of Indonesia for the period 2015-2019**.

In the case of "Mama Minta Saham" which dragged the names of Setya Novanto (Chairperson **of the Republic of Indonesia** Parliament), Maroef Syamsoeddin and businessman Reza Chalid **at the end of** 2015, for example, circulated transcripts of their talks where Setya Novanto mentioned Luhut's name 66 times and placed Luhut as an "operator" of Jokowi's thinking. At least the discourse shows the influence of Luhut Binsar Panjaitan in the current ruling of the Indonesian elite (<https://news.detik.com>).

Naturally, **at the end of** Jokowi-JK's administration, Luhut became Jokowi's "mouthpiece". In the discourse on the search for the graves of victims of the 1966 riots, for example, Luhut continued Jokowi's order that the search for victims of the riots be continued. Thus, following Althusser's thinking, that discourse is a representation of certain political forces, the position of Luhut is attached to Jokowi.

Third, Gatot Nurmantyo, similar to Jokowi playing on two legs, but the difference is Gatot is putting one foot to Jokowi and the other to the modern Islamic community ("Islam Kanan"). In the discourse of communism, Gatot is clearly (explicitly) declaring his hostility to the ideology of communism. Its proximity to the Right Islam for example can be shown in the events of the incident several times Gatot attended the invitation **of the Prosperous Justice Party** (PKS). This made President Jokowi issue a statement so that the



TNI cannot enter politics.

Chairman of the PKS faction, Jazuli Juwaini, said that it was only natural that President Jokowi as the top commander in the TNI warned that the TNI would not enter practical politics. Even so, he stressed, TNI Commander, General Gatot Nurmantyo had no political maneuver at all. "I also did not see that the TNI was politically maneuvering.

If a commander is invited by a political party, that does not mean political maneuvering because we talk about the nation and about the Pancasila, NKRI, "Jazuli said at the Parliament Building, Jakarta, Thursday, October 5, 2017 (<http://www.viva.co.id>). Through the discourse of communism, there was a contestation over sympathy for Jokowi between Gatot and Binsar.

Fourth, Kivlan Zein, like Luhut, is a former TNI retiree who is active in politics. Luhut is affiliated with PDI P while Kivlan is in the Gerindra Party. Kivlan chose extreme challenges to communism. Seeing the discourse, Kivlan will bring the issue of communism to Gerindra Party's identity politics in the future. Following Althusser's thinking, the

ideological state apparatus, the pattern of the spread of communist ideology has implications for the party and individual maps as follows: Diagram 1.

Implications of Reproduction of Discourse in Individual Power Relations Luhut Binsar Panjaitan Gatot Nurmantyo PKS Kivlan Zein Joko Widodo Prabowo Subianto Source: Processed by Researchers But at the beginning of August 2018, all of the above analyzes did not get evidence in the political realities both from the sides of Jokowi and Prabowo.

In this context, it can be interpreted that the production of discourse and reproduction of discourse used as a thesis provokes the opposing party to make a decision. The figures who were previously included in the discourse of Jokowi's vice presidential candidates such as Muhaimin Iskandar, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, and Tito Karnavian were not taken into consideration.

Jokowi's decision to choose KH Ma'ruf Amin as a Candidate for the Vice President could not deny that the decision was in response to Jokowi's concerns about the Right Islamic which proved to be able to overturn the political map in the previous year's DKI Jakarta Governor Election contestation. As Chairman of the MUI, at that time Ma'ruf Amin was involved in an effort to convince the Judge to decide that Basuki Tjahya Purnama alias Ahok was guilty of blasphemy, because it was considered close to the Right Islamic circle which was considered "hard".

But on the other hand Ma'ruf Amin is also considered a figure who can mobilize the Nahdliyin (NU) because of Amin's position as the Rois Am moderate Islamic organization. Until here it can be concluded, that both Prabowo and Jokowi, were unable to avoid politics of identity or borrow S Seldman and C Johnston's language, ideological politics.

According to S Feldman and C Johnston, current political discourse is indeed unable to avoid the issue of ideology (politicization of religion), and economic issues. (S Feldman & C Johnston, 2014: 337) The Reproduction RSA (Repressive State Apparatus) The outbreak of the discourse of communism seems to have caused Jokowi's government to self-evaluate. If it continues, it will tend to harm its image as the president and the next presidential candidate.

Parties who take advantage of the discourse are political opponents, especially the "right" Muslims who carry communism as material for

the demonstration. Therefore, the next government reproduces the discourse of counter-discourse to reduce the discourse of communism. The bearers of the anti-communism discourse were positioned **as a threat to the** Republic of Indonesia, not Pancasila, and intolerance.

It was confirmed on the occasion of the anniversary of the Pancasila on June 1, 2017, Jokowi launched a number of supporting discourses such as: mutual cooperation, tolerance, national unity, diversity, and mentioning threat discourses such as radicalism and terrorism (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2p7-taNanhU>). After that, the President issued Presidential Regulation no.54 of 2017 which contained the establishment of a Presidential **Work Unit for the** Development of Pancasila Ideology.

Then the President **issued a Government Regulation in lieu of the Law No. 2 of 2017** to replace Law No.13 of 2013 concerning Community Organizations. Based on the Perpu, the government dissolved HTI (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia) because it was considered not based on Pancasila. The reproduction of discourse by the apartment was followed by a very massive movement, both in the mass media and activities carried out by the community such as seminars, community service, and mobilization of community components (colleges, pesantren, and government offices).

This movement then reproduces **the discourse of the** danger of understanding and ideology of radicalism. As many as 79 chancellors of universities spread across 12 provinces gathered at Mahendradatta University, Denpasar, Bali on Thursday (07/27/2017). They held a focus group discussion (FGD) to discuss ways to anticipate the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism (<http://regional.kompas.com>).

Jokowi's apparatus had succeeded in creating a situation as if around us had been exposed to radicalism. Communism and corrupt behavior are lost from the discourse. Althusser has exactly said that ideology is a dialectic characterized by unequal power or dominance. Finally Althusser believes that ideology can be seen as a practice rather than an idea. If this is done by the State, it is called a repressive state apparatus (RSA).

Through the ideological tool, the State forces the perceptions, values, and actions of the community to be the same as those formulated or perceived. In Althusser's view, ideology is often used as a tool to perpetuate oppression (Eriyanto, 2001: p.98). Instead, it can also perpetuate power. Through the RSA approach, the issue of communism reproduced into a radicalism issue was then concretized as "radicalism is an understanding that seeks to replace the basic state of Pancasila with other symbols".

The meaning of the danger of communism shifted its subject from the perpetrators and

adherents of communism which is associated with the events of September 30, 1965 to become perpetrators or adherents who want to replace the Pancasila. Many of the spreaders of the latent danger of communism were supported by right-wing Muslims, as spread through "youtube".

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and other organizations were very keen to take to the streets rejecting communism ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VzHDonjbAo](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VzHDonjbAo)). Also noted Prijanto (Deputy Governor of Jakarta for the 2007-2012) said that if Jokowi was President, communism would live again ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN7eoySlkg4](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HN7eoySlkg4)). Young people from IAIN Jember also uploaded their rejection of communism ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_CMSno52vYY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CMSno52vYY)).

Also the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council features a lecture by Alfian Tanjung that links the dangers of communism with the rise of immigrants from China ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJSj2JaVtu4](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJSj2JaVtu4)). By typing in the keyword "communism" hundreds of videos appeared that rejected communism on YouTube. Among the Islamic

organizations and the Islamic community which are the most passionate about FPI organizations, but because these organizations are based on Pancasila, they have survived the dissolution. The only thing that **can be used to** strengthen the narrative of "radicalism with the meaning of anti-Pancasila" is the HTI organization.

Thus HTI is the only victim of this RSA. Even though there is only one mass organization, as a narrative it **can be used to** build a broader discourse so that it generalizes RSA as a function of socializing ideologies that identify themselves as groups that are against the State **of the Republic of** Indonesia.

So far (until this article was completed) each of these groups did not arrive at a horizontal conflict. Both continue their discourse by leaving the source of the conflict. The government continued its RSA to slowly abandon the word "communism" and replace it with the notion of radicalism, then once justify it with the term "terrorism".

To attract leftist Muslims, RSA adopted the terms "Islam Rahmatan lilalamin", "Moderate Islam", "Islam Nusantara", and "Soothing Islam", while those who originally used the issue of communism chose to remain silent. So far, the silence of the Islamists who reject communism has not yet seen its future direction. In several groups on social media, this group changed the theme of discussion of communism "signs of the last day", "the morning prayer movement", and others that seemed soft.

Thematic metamorphosis can be interpreted **as an effort to** maintain communication networks in the media that are considered not intervened by the authority of the apparatus. So that the communication network cells that are swept away by the Law on Mass Organizations can still be maintained and in the right time can be revived. The right time according to researchers is during **the 2019 general elections** to elect the DPR and the President.

**Analysis of Power on Discourse** Another interesting analysis of Foucault's framework is about who is a character who plays a discourse to guard the source of his power. In large flows (national macro) there are at least four figures around the discourse, namely: President Jokowi played a discourse on communism to safeguard sources of support from nationalists. So that the base of voters who want to be maintained from PDI- P, Hanura, Nasdem, and PKB.

Even if Jokowi wants to realize it with Muslims, his choice is moderate Islam. The risk is that Jokowi will be shunned by right-line Muslims. Secondly, Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo himself did not actively play the discourse of communism, but used the figures of both tier figures, such as Kiflan Zein and Fadli Zon. This group is in line with

supporters of the Gerindra and PKS parties, while from Muhammadiyah and PAN circles, they chose to reject communism but with a gentle slope. Third, Chief of Police Tito Karnavian.

This figure plays an important role in completing the demonstration of blasphemy entitled "Action of 212", although he tends to reject the demonstration, but as a person he is on stage with the figures of "Action of 212". And Tito was the one who succeeded in dividing the opinion from the act of rejecting blasphemy as a "threat of treason" carried out by other figures such as Rahmawati Sukarnoputri and others. The current actions of the National Police can divide public opinion, so that the mainstream media issues are divided.

Yuzril Izha Mahendra as attorney for Rachmawati Soekarnoputri said this: "The arrest of a number of suspected parties pledged by the police is allegedly related to a number of special meetings with Rachmawati Soekarnoputri. Yusril said, the meeting took place after an open meeting at the University of Bung Karno which was



attended by a number of activist figures.

He said, the special meeting was allegedly related to the charges of the police regarding the plot of treason" ([www.cnnindonesia.com/](http://www.cnnindonesia.com/) 20161202) At the end of August 2017, Tito performed the Hajj. The news spreads in mainstream media and online media. After returning to the pilgrimage, Tito was friendlier to the Islamic community. Never even discourse about radicalism anymore.

Thus, the reproduction of communism and radicalism built the figure of Tito as a figure who was friendly, tolerant, and tackled the problem tactical. In the context of religious politicization, it seems that religion will always be a sexy issue for politicians to gain their votes, as long as the religious understanding of Muslims in Indonesia is still textual, dogmatic and doctrinal.

If religious understanding is more directed at the form of substantive Islam (Susanto, 2018: 68), then the politicization of religion by itself can be eliminated, because the public will increasingly understand, that true religiosity is ideally to give benefit to all humanity, to overcome poverty, ignorance, and realize social justice (Maghfur et al., 2012: 2; Susanto, 2017: 238).

Above all, based on the phenomenon of politicization of religion, the irony of ideology shown in the political process, and the production and reproduction of discourses carried out by the two camps, the final estuary is how to win the 2019 election stage. Post- election results, discourse production and reproduction may change drastically from the production and reproduction of discourse carried out during the campaign.

**CONCLUSION** Both the Prabowo and Jokowi camps are both unable to avoid the politicization of religion. To a certain extent, religion is often used as an ideology in fighting for politics, its role is often biased, so it cannot be read clearly, where is the real ideology of a political power.

What remains is the battle of discourse, in the form of production of discourse from one camp, to then be reproduced again by the other faction in raising the electoral towards the 2019 election. For example, communism as a discourse managed to divide the political power between those who supported and refused. Each produces these discourses with various reproductive derivatives.

In its level of dissemination through mainstream media and on- line media the discourse of communism has changed to "radicalism." The reproduction of its derivatives was used by the RSA as a counterattack, so groups that rejected communism were indirectly

stigmatized as radical groups, hence added with the "anti Pancasila" and "Anti NKRI" discourse.

The reproduction of discourse on radicalism is more massive, in terms of using existing apparatus as well as through mainstream media, so that the discourse of communism has been successfully sunk or left behind. Instead, the government which was initially accused of being a supporter of communism managed to beat back opponents of its political opponents with the stigma of radicalism.

Through Althusser's logic, the process of **production and reproduction of** discourse like this shows the dominant power of the State to eliminate discourses that does not benefit its credibility.



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